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Abstract 
 Recent research has shown that unconscious thought can improve the quality of 
complex decisions (Dijksterhuis, 2004; Dijksterhuis, Bos, Nordgren & Van Baaren, 
2006). In the present research we investigate whether unconscious thought is goal-
dependent. In four experiments participants were given information pertaining to a 
decision problem or to an impression formation problem. Subsequently, they were either 
given time to think consciously about the information or they were distracted for some 
time, during which they could engage in unconscious thought. Of the participants that 
were distracted however, some were given the goal to further process the information, 
whereas others were not given such a goal. Our experiments clearly show that 
unconscious thought is goal-dependent. Without a goal, people do not engage in 
unconscious thought. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Anyone who has ever bought a house knows that choosing between various 
complex, multifaceted alternatives can be a daunting task. Common wisdom dictates that 
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thorough conscious thought improves the quality of people’s decisions for such complex 
objects, but this is often not the case (Dijksterhuis, 2004; Dijksterhuis, Bos, Nordgren & 
van Baaren, 2006). Conscious thought often leads people to use inappropriate heuristics 
and conscious thinkers can fall prey to biases that often harm decisions (Dijksterhuis & 
Nordgren, 2006; Wilson & Schooler, 1991). In addition, conscious capacity is low, 
making conscious thought more fruitful for relatively simple decisions, but not for 
complex ones (Dijksterhuis et al., 2006).  
 However, it has been demonstrated recently that a period of unconscious thought 
can improve the quality of people’s decisions (Dijksterhuis et al., 2006; Dijksterhuis & 
Nordgren, 2006). Unconscious thought can best be defined as thought or reasoning that 
takes place when conscious attention is directed elsewhere. In research in our laboratory, 
we demonstrated that unconscious thought can be highly adaptive. In most of our 
previous experiments, participants were first presented with information pertaining to a 
decision problem. They were later asked questions about this information (usually they 
were asked to choose among alternatives) under three different conditions. Participants 
either decided immediately after being presented with the information, or they decided 
after a period of conscious thought, or they decided after a period of distraction during 
which they engaged in unconscious thought. The common result was that unconscious 
thinkers made better decisions than participants in the other two conditions.  
In the current work, we want to shed more light on the process of unconscious 
thought. The specific nature of our unconscious thought conditions in earlier experiments 
leaves an important question unanswered: Is unconscious thought goal-dependent? One 
possibility is that we always (or at least very often) engage in unconscious thought after 
having processed information. If this is the case, unconscious thought is merely a residual 
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
  On the goal-dependency of unconscious thought 4 
process that follows the encoding of information. Another possibility is that unconscious 
thought only takes place when we have the goal to do so. It would mean that, after having 
encoded information, we only engage in further unconscious thought if it is important, for 
instance because we have to make a decision with the help of this information. At face 
value, one could argue that the first possibility – unconscious thought as a residual 
process following encoding – is rather inefficient. After all, we process enormous 
amounts of information on a daily basis, and thinking about all of this would become a 
daunting enterprise, even for the unconscious with its high capacity. That being said, the 
fact that one alternative may be somewhat inefficient is not a sufficient reason to decline 
it.  
Our earlier work does not speak to whether unconscious thought is goal-
dependent. Participants in the unconscious thought conditions were always given a goal, 
or at least an expectation that they would later have to do something with the information 
they had encoded (again, usually to make a decision). For instance, after having read 
about four cars, but immediately before they were distracted, participants were told that 
they would have to answer questions about the cars later (Dijksterhuis et al., 2006) or 
after having been presented with information about apartments participants were told that 
they would later have to choose among them (Dijksterhuis, 2004). Hence, we know 
unconscious thought takes place when people have a goal that involves further processing 
of the information, but what happens without such a goal?  
 
The question whether unconscious thought is goal-dependent is important from a 
theoretical perspective, because it helps us to better understand the process of 
unconscious thought. An alternative explanation for unconscious thought effects is the 
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process of set-shifting (see e.g., Schooler & Melcher, 1995, for an elaboration in the 
domain of creativity). That is, one could assume that the beneficial effects of a period of 
distraction from a decision problem do not result from an active unconscious thought 
process, but merely from the disruption of non-productive conscious thought. For 
instance, people often approach a problem with wrong cues, wrong heuristics and/or 
wrong information. Following a period of distraction, such wrong approaches become 
less accessible or are forgotten altogether. The effects of distraction on a change of 
mental set can be both very pronounced (such as when one tries to solve a chess problem 
and initially gets truly “fixed” in thinking along a wrong path) or more subtle (such as 
when distraction attenuates the biasing influence of primacy or recency effects). Such 
processes are often categorized under the umbrella of the “fresh look” explanation: 
Putting a problem aside for a while allows for a fresh, unbiased new start.   
 However, we maintain (see Dijksterhuis, 2004; Dijksterhuis et al., 2006; 
Dijksterhuis & Nordgren, 2006) that unconscious thought is an active process. During a 
period of distraction, unconscious thought leads to a different (i.e., better) organization of 
information in memory and to a more clear, polarized evaluation of different decision 
alternatives. The present research helps us to distinguish between active, unconscious 
thought, as we propose, and the “fresh look” alternative whereby people merely benefit 
from distraction because it interrupts conscious thought. After all, an explanation in terms 
of set-shifting would predict that unconscious thought effects are independent of goals 
and that only a period of distraction is necessary for unconscious thought effects to occur. 
One may be skeptical about the possibility of unconscious thought being goal-
dependent, because goal pursuit has long been associated with the need of conscious 
guidance (Bandura, 1986; Carver & Scheier, 1998; Deci & Ryan, 1985; Gollwitzer, 1990; 
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Locke & Latham, 1990; summaries in Gollwitzer & Moskowitz, 1996; Mischel, Cantor, 
& Feldman, 1996; Oettingen & Gollwitzer, 2001). However, the current state of affairs in 
the literature on goal-pursuit allows for the possibility of unconscious thought being goal-
dependent. In previous experiments conducted in our laboratory, participants in the 
unconscious thought conditions were told that they would later have to use the 
information again, for instance to make a decision. This implies that, goal setting (making 
a decision) was conscious. However, if indeed unconscious thought is goal-dependent, it 
it follows that in our experiments goal-monitoring was unconscious. That is, control of 
the progress towards reaching the goal, which accompanies goal pursuit, was done during 
unconscious thought. Recent research demonstrates that this is possible indeed. We know 
that not only can goals be set unconsciously (Bargh & Gollwitzer, 1994; Moskowitz, 
Gollwitzer, Wasel, & Schaal, 1999), but also that they can be monitored unconsciously 
(Bongers & Dijksterhuis, 2006; Moskowitz, Li, & Kirk, 2004), In fact, goals can even run 
to completion without any conscious guidance (Bargh, 1990; Bargh & Chartrand, 1999; 
Bargh & Gollwitzer, 1994; Bargh, Gollwitzer, Barndollar, & Trötschel, 2001).  
Overview of the experiments 
To test whether unconscious thought is goal-dependent, we conducted four 
experiments. In Experiments 1a and 1b, participants were given information about four 
cars. One of the four cars was made more attractive than the others, whereas one was 
made less attractive than the others. In Experiment 1a, participants later judged the cars 
and the difference between the attitudes towards the two cars was taken as a measure for 
how well participants could distinguish between the good and the bad car (as in 
Dijksterhuis, 2004; Dijksterhuis et al., 2006). In Experiment 1b, participants were asked 
to recall as many aspects of the cars as possible. Before the dependent variables were 
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administered in Experiments 1a and 1b, participants were divided into three conditions. 
Participants were either probed after a period of conscious thought, or after a period of 
distraction that started with the instruction they would have to answer questions about  
the information (the unconscious thought condition in our previous work). In a third, new 
condition, participants were distracted after they had been told that the task about the 
about the cars was over and hence, that they would not have to answer any questions 
about the cars anymore (from now on, the “mere distraction condition”).  
In Experiment 2, participants were given behavioral information about a target 
person. They were asked to write down as much as they could remember about the target 
person, either after mere distraction or after a period of unconscious thought. The amount 
of clustering of the behavioral information, indicating the organization of the information 
in memory, was measured (as in Dijksterhuis, 2004).  
In Experiment 3, participants were given information about two different decision 
problems, namely cars and roommates. They were then given the goal to either 
unconsciously think about the cars or about the roommates. After a period of unconscious 
thought, they were asked to rate both the cars and the roommates on attractiveness. With 
this experiment we explored to what extent more specific goals can affect unconscious 
thought. Can we strategically think unconsciously about one thing but not the other, even 
if the information was encoded at the same time? 
 
Experiment 1a: Method 
 
Participants and Design 
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Participants were undergraduate students recruited at the university of 
Amsterdam. Of the 47 participants, 18 were male. The average age was 20.7 (SD=2.89). 
Participants either received course credits or money (7 euros) for their participation. The 
participants were assigned to one of three conditions: a conscious thought condition, an 
unconscious thought condition, or a mere-distraction condition. 
Procedure and Materials 
The experiment was conducted in a series of many unrelated experiments. All the 
experiments were conducted on a computer  Participants were told they would receive 
information about four cars, named the Dasuka, the Nabusi, the Kaiwa and the Hatsdun. 
They were asked to pay close attention to the information. The paradigm was the same as 
the one used by Dijksterhuis et al. (2006). Each of the four cars was described with 12 
attributes (for instance, the Dasuka is brand new, the Nabusi has good mileage, etc.). One 
of the cars was the best car, with 8 positive attributes and 4 negative attributes, one car 
was the worst, with 4 positive attributes and 8 negative attributes and the other cars were 
intermediate, with both 6 positive and 6 negative attributes. As not all attributes were 
equally important, we made sure that the best car excelled on the most  important aspects 
whereas the worst car excelled primarily on unimportant attributes. The 48 pieces of 
information were presented to the participants on a computer screen. Each piece was 
presented for 4 seconds, with a 0.5 second interval between . 
After the presentation of the information participants were assigned to one of the 
three conditions. The participants in the conscious thought condition were asked to think 
about their impression of the cars for four minutes. The participants in the mere-
distraction condition were shown a standard screen, used many times previously in 
experiments in the same research lab, indicating that the experiment was now over and 
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that they would continue to do another task. They then received a distraction task in 
which they were asked to solve a word search puzzle. In the word search puzzle, we used 
only neutral, mundane words (e.g. ‘chair’ or ‘table’). The participants in the unconscious 
thought condition were told that they would have to perform another task, but that after 
this task they would be asked about their opinion about the cars, thereby giving them the 
goal to process the information during the distraction task they received. Their distraction 
task was the same as in the mere distraction condition.  
Afterwards, all participants were given 20-point attitude scales, asking them their 
opinion about the cars (e.g. “to what extent did you think the Nabusi was a good car?”, 
ranging from ‘not at all’ to ‘very much so’). 
Results 
Participants’ performance was assessed by subtracting their attitude score for the 
worst car from their attitude score for the best car. This created an attitude difference 
score indicating to what extent participants were able to differentiate between the best 
and the worst car (taken from Dijksterhuis et al, 2006; see also Dijksterhuis, 2004).  
The three difference-scores were compared in an analysis of variance. A main 
effect of condition was found, F (2, 44) = 12.53, p < .01, ç 2 = 0.36. The attitude difference 
score for the participants in the unconscious thought condition (M=7.00, SD=4.04) 
differed significantly from the attitude difference score for the participants in the 
conscious thought condition (M=1.26, SD=3.49), F (1, 32) = 19.71, p < .01, ç 2 = 0.38, and 
from the attitude difference score for the participants in the mere-distraction condition 
(M=0.54, SD=4.29), F (1, 26) = 16.83, p < .01, ç 2 = 0.39. These latter two scores  did not 
differ significantly (F < 1).  
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Experiment 1b 
The instruction in the mere distraction condition, where the participants were led 
to believe they would continue with a different experiment, allows for a different 
explanation of the findings of Experiment 1a. The results could potentially be explained 
by a “directed forgetting effect” as described by MacLeod (1998). Work on directed 
forgetting shows that giving participants an instruction to forget results in poorer memory 
of information compared to when participants are given an instruction to remember. The 
instruction our participants in the mere distraction were given, could be conceived of as 
similar to an instruction to forget. It is possible that the difference in attitude between the 
unconscious thought and the mere distraction condition was caused not by actual 
unconscious thought in the appropriate condition, but by differential memory. Perhaps 
participants in both conditions simply judged on the basis of what they could recall after 
the distraction task, whereby participants in the mere distraction condition 
underperformed because they had forgotten the relevant information. As this is an 
alternative explanation worth exploring, we conducted Experiment 1b. The experiment is 
exactly the same as Experiment 1a, but instead of their attitudes towards the cars, 
participants were now asked to write down as much as they could remember about each 
car.  
Participants 
Participants were undergraduate students recruited at the university of Nijmegen. 
Of the 126 participants, 35 were male. The average age was 21.6 (SD=3.79). Participants 
either received course credits or money (8 euros) for their participation. 
Procedure 
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 The procedure for Experiment 1b was almost identical to the procedure for 
Experiment 1a, but instead of their attitude towards the cars, participants were now 
instructed to write down as much as they could remember about the cars. They were 
given three minutes for this task. 
 
Results 
As each of the four cars had been described with both positive and negative information, 
we analyzed the recall data according to a 3 (Condition: Conscious Thought vs. 
Unconscious Thought vs. Mere distraction) x 4 (Car A to D) x 2 (Valence: Positive 
versus Negative information) with the last two factors within-participants. Our analyses 
of variance confirmed that participants did not differ in their total recall of information, 
not in the recall of positive information nor recall of negative information, not with 
respect to recall errors and not with respect to recall of any one of the cars (all Fs < 1). 
Discussion 
Experiment 1a clearly showed that participants in the conscious thought condition 
were outperformed by participants in the unconscious thought condition in their ability to 
distinguish between the best car and the worst car. With this effect, we replicated our 
earlier work. More importantly, participants in the unconscious thought condition also 
outperformed the participants in the mere distraction condition demonstrating that 
unconscious thought is goal-directed and at the same time refuting a set-shifting or 
“fresh-look” alternative explanation. Experiment 1b showed that the findings in 
Experiment 1a cannot be explained by directed forgetting occurring in the mere 
distraction condition. In sum, in combination the findings of Experiment 1a and 1b 
provide strong support for the hypothesis that unconscious thought is goal-dependent. 
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Experiment 2 
In Experiment 2, we used a different paradigm to test the goal-dependency of 
unconscious thought. The paradigm was taken from Dijksterhuis (2004, Experiment 5). 
In that experiment, participants received information about a person, Jeroen, with the 
instruction to form an impression of him. Jeroen was described by 18 behaviors and these 
behaviors were all descriptive of one of three personality traits. Later recall data showed 
that participants who had thought about Jeroen unconsciously had clustered the 
information in memory around these three traits. Participants who had thought about 
Jeroen consciously or who had not thought about Jeroen at all did not show this 
organization of the information in memory. In the present experiment, we try to replicate 
this experiment with, in addition to an unconscious thought condition, a mere distraction 
condition.  
In Experiment 2, we decided not to include a conscious thought condition. In 
Experiments 1a and 1b we included such a condition to be able to replicate the effects we 
found in our earlier work (i.e., that unconscious thought leads to better decisions than 
conscious thought), but a conscious thought condition is not necessary for the hypothesis 
under consideration.  
In Experiment 1a and 1b, participants in the mere distraction condition were given 
information about the four cars and were then told that the experiment was over. 
Although we refuted an alternative explanation in terms of differential recall in 
Experiment 1b, it could still be the case that the instruction given in Experiment 1a and 
1b comes across as odd for participants, as they receive information they are then asked 
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not to do anything with. For this reason, in Experiment 2 we used a slightly different 
procedure.  
Method 
Participants and Design 
Forty native Dutch undergraduate students were recruited at the University of 
Amsterdam. Of the 40 participants with an average age of 21.2 (SD=3.49), 7 were male. 
Participants either received course credits or money (7 euros) for their participation. The 
participants were assigned to one of two conditions: an unconscious thought condition 
and a mere distraction condition 
Procedure and Materials  
Participants were told they would be presented with information about a person 
named “Jeroen.”. Subsequently, 18 short sentences were presented one by one on the 
screen in random order. A sentence stayed on the screen for 5 seconds, with the next 
sentence appearing after a pause of half a second. All sentences were pre-tested to load 
on one of three trait categories. Six of the sentences indicated intelligence, 6 others were 
indicative of Jeroen being athletic and the remaining 6 were indicative of Jeroen being 
politically left-wing.  
 As said, in Experiment 1a and 1b we told participants in the mere distraction 
condition that the experiment was over immediately after they had encoded the 
information. Some participants may have found this hard to believe. We deemed such 
information to be more plausible after giving participants the feeling that they had at least 
done something with the information they had just read. Therefore, participants were 
asked how sympathetic they thought Jeroen was immediately after they had read the 
information about Jeroen. They could indicate their answer on a 9-point scale.  
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Subsequently, participants were assigned to the conditions. In the mere distraction 
condition, participants were told the experiment was over and that they would now 
continue with another task. In the unconscious thought condition, participants were told 
they would continue with another task, but that they would be asked a couple of questions 
about Jeroen afterwards. The distraction task consisted of anagrams. After the distraction 
task, participants were given four minutes to write down as much as they could remember 
about Jeroen. 
Results and Discussion 
In order to compare the amount of clustering in memory of the information, a 
clustering score was computed per participant. We did this by calculating conditional 
probabilities in the free recall protocol (see Dijksterhuis, 2004; Hamilton, Driscoll, & 
Worth, 1989 and Dijksterhuis & Van Knippenberg, 1996). The number of same-trait 
sequences (e.g., an intelligent behavior recalled after another intelligent behavior) was 
divided by the total number of behaviors recalled minus one. Higher clustering scores 
represent more integration and organization in memory of the information. . Indeed, tthe 
clustering scores re higher in the unconscious thought condition (M=0.45, SD=1.56) than 
in the mere-distraction condition (M=0.28, SD=1.54), t (1, 38) = 3.45, p < .01, ç 2 = 0.24. 
Participants who were given the goal to think unconsciously show greater organization 
and integration than participants in the mere distraction.  
Experiment 3 
In Experiment 3 we go one step further. Now that it is demonstrated that 
unconscious thought is goal dependent, is it possible that unconscious thought is sensitive 
to more specific goals? In Experiments 1 and 2, the activated goal was very general in the 
sense that participants knew they would be probed about the information they had just 
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read. But what if they know they will only be probed about some of the information, but 
not all? 
In Experiment 3, we present participants with information about two decision 
problems: One about cars, and one about roommates. Later, some participants are given 
the goal to reach a decision about the cars, whereas other are given the goal to decide 
between the roommates. After a period of unconscious thought, all participants are asked 
about the cars and about the roommates. The question is whether someone who has the 
goal to decide between cars but not roommates will indeed make a better decision about 
the cars than about the roommates, and vice versa.  
Method 
Participants and Design 
138 undergraduate students from the University of Amsterdam participated in the 
Experiment. Of the 138 participants, with an average age of 21 (SD=2.65), 52 were male. 
They received either course credits or money (7 euros) for their participation. They were 
assigned to one of two conditions: an unconscious thought condition where they were 
given the goal to think unconsciously about cars or an unconscious thought condition 
where they were given the goal to think unconsciously about roommates.  
Procedure and Materials 
In Experiment 3 participants received information about three cars and three 
roommates. Each car and each roommate was described by ten aspects. One of the cars 
was the best car, with 8 positive and 2 negative aspects. Another car was the worst of the 
three with 2 positive and 8 negative aspects. The third car had both 5 positive and 5 
negative aspects. The roommate materials were constructed the same way: One 
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roommate had 8 positive and 2 negative aspects, one had 2 positive and 8 negative 
aspects and the third roommate had both 5 positive and 5 negative aspects.  
In total, participants received 60 pieces of information. The information was 
shown in random order, whereby all information appeared on the screen for 4 seconds. 
After the presentation of the information, participants were then either told they would 
later be asked questions about the cars or they were told they would later be asked 
questions about the roommates. They were then given an n-back task for distraction. In 
the n-back task, participants see numbers on the computer screen for one second, with 
half a second between the numbers. If the number they see is the same number as the 
number n places before, they are supposed to press the spacebar. In the present 
experiment a 2-back task was used. The 2-back task is not very difficult to perform, but 
does require a lot of conscious attention, thereby disabling conscious thought about any 
other information (Jonides, et al., 1997).  
Afterwards, all participants were given 20-point attitude scales, asking them to 
rate the cars and the roommates (e.g. “to what extent did you think Roommate 1 was a 
good roommate?”, ranging from ‘not at all’ to ‘very much so’). 
Results and Discussion 
To assess how well participants were able to distinguish between the best and the 
worst alternative for both the cars and the roommates, attitude difference scores were 
created by subtracting the attitude score for the worst car from the attitude score for the 
best car and by subtracting the attitude score for the worst roommate from the attitude 
score for the best roommate. To test the hypothesis that giving participants the goal to 
think about one topic and not the other leads to differential unconscious thought, we 
compared the difference scores between conditions using a 2 (Condition: goal to think 
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about cars vs. goal to think about roommates)  x 2 (Difference score: cars vs. roommates) 
analysis of variance.   
The predicted interaction was significant, F (1, 136) = 4.12, p < .05, ηp2 =  .03. 
Participants were better able to distinguish between the best and the worst alternative for 
the materials they were asked to think about than for the materials they were not asked to 
think about. Indeed, the effect of condition on the difference score for the roommates was 
significant, F (1, 136) = 4.64, p < .05, ηp2 = .03. Participants who were given the goal to 
think unconsciously about the roommates showed a higher difference score for the 
roommates (M=7.94, SD=4.87) than participants who were given the goal to think 
unconsciously about the cars (M=5.97, SD=5.87). Participants who were given the goal to 
think unconsciously about the cars did not show a significantly higher difference score 
for the cars (M=3.00, SD=5.91) than participants who where given a goal to think about 
the roommates (M=2.81, SD=6.39), F (1,136) < 1, ns. Still, the significant two-way 
interaction allows for the conclusion that unconscious thought is not just goal-dependent, 
but also capable of obeying goals that are quite specific. 
We also obtained a main effect of materials, F (1, 136) = 57,71, p < .01, ηp2 = .30. 
Participants were better able to distinguish the quality of the roommates than to 
distinguish the quality of the cars. This effect, unimportant for our hypothesis, may have 
been caused by the fact that the attractive and the unattractive roommates indeed differed 
more than the attractive and the unattractive cars. Another reason may be that the 
information that was presented about the cars was less interesting for participants than the 
information that was presented about the potential roommates.  
General discussion 
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The results of the four experiments demonstrated that unconscious thought is a 
goal-dependent process. Without the goal to process the information for a later purpose, 
unconscious thought does not occur. Giving participants the goal to think unconsciously 
prior to a distraction task improved their performance on attitude formation (Experiment 
1a) and on information integration (Experiment 2). Furthermore, giving participants a 
specific goal to think about some information and not others was obeyed by unconscious 
thought (Experiment 3).  
Our findings have various implications. Theoretically, the findings are important 
as they support the idea that unconscious thought is an active thought process. The 
alternative idea, that participants in our work simply benefit from set-shifting (or, a “fresh 
look”) because of a period of distraction is refuted by the current data. Participants in our 
mere distraction conditions could just as well have engaged in set-shifting, but they did 
not benefit from it. They consistently underperformed relative to participants in the 
unconscious thought conditions.  
The current findings are also relevant from a practical perspective, because they 
show that unconscious thought can be applied strategically. We can benefit from the 
powerful and high capacity unconscious thought at will, by actively deciding to delegate 
thinking to the unconscious. The question is to what extent we can do this. How flexible 
is unconscious thought? Our last experiment suggests a remarkable degree of flexibility 
in that people can decide to unconsciously think about some things and not others. 
Other questions remain though. What if one processes information about a 
number of houses, and only then hears that the objective is to choose a house for one’s 
grandmother who cannot negotiate stairs anymore? This requires a certain degree of goal-
flexibility. And what about goal strength? Is unconscious thought more effective for 
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things that are extremely important than for things that are moderately important? 
Finally, and this is important with respect to ecological validity: How and when do we 
implement the goal to unconsciously think in real life, that is, when there are no 
convenient instructions provided by experimenters? The bottom-line is that the current 
findings open up a host of new questions related to the potential flexibility and 
sophistication of unconscious thought.  
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